The word terrorism first became popular during the French Revolution - the regime de la terreur - initially a positive political system using fear, according to Bruce Hoffman:
"to consolidate the new French government's power by intimidating counter-revolutionaries, subversives and all other dissidents whom the new regime regarded as enemies of the people...and in its original context was closely associated with the ideals of virtue and democracy." 19
To achieve their illegal goals International criminals use terror, and the methods of the terrorist. Mafia (Russian, Albanian and Sicilian) and Chinese triads use terror; all these groups operate extensively in the Asia- Pacific. Money laundering is an aspect of criminal activity that often ends up with terror and intimidation being applied.
The extensive, lucrative criminal narcotics industry, and associated support networks function as corporate terrorists, ensuring that syndicate power and influence remain undiminished. Heads of narcotic empires in some parts of the world have greater power Prime Ministers, controlling an empire with a GDP far exceeding that of New Zealand.
As a generalisation, I believe that until recently terrorism in the Asia- Pacific resulted from locally generated and deeply rooted socio-economic or political factors. I believe too that the majority of people in the Asia-Pacific thought that international terrorism was something that happened in other parts of the world, and because we are so far away from those parts of the world where these horrendous events usually happened, we were immune. The Bali bombings on 12 October 2002 changed these views. People who viewed international terrorism as some remote phenomenon now do not, and while the cause(s) of the attack may be "local", they now recognise that it may have also international roots and support.
New Zealand nationals were killed in Bali, as did Australia the United Kingdom and others. Clearly, those who thought that they were immune had a very rude and frightening awakening. Not only did the media, rather prematurely in my view, immediately place the blame at the door of Islamists, but also it generally singled out al Qaeda20.
It seems to me that this knee-jerk reaction disregarded and failed to analyse such factors as the US domestic political environment, the Indonesian domestic political environment in which terrorist acts had been happening for the past thirty years, the nature of terrorism itself, and Islamic inspired terrorism in particular. This cursory analysis also ignored the fact that the vast majority of regional Islamists are moderate, tolerant people who respect and coexist peacefully with other religions. By demonising al Qaeda, and Islam in general, the media polarised opinion, and in doing so may have served to drive some moderate Islamists towards a more radical position. This lack of analytical rigour is a regrettable symptom of New Zealand's long-standing ignorance of the culture, religion, and politics of our closest Asian neighbours. As it turns out, the initial assertions by the media are probably correct.
Of course, the Asia Pacific has never been immune from terrorist attacks. Coups in Fiji, which included the terrorising of Indian Fijians, terrorism in Papua New Guinea perpetrated by "rascals" in Port Moresby and secessionists in other parts of the country, politically inspired terrorism in Vanuatu, and yet more secessionists in New Caledonia. Communist terrorists in Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines for example, while in Indonesia separatists in Aceh and West Papua, and sectarian killings continue in the Mollucas. Terrorists who have gained experience fighting as volunteers in Afghanistan are now resident in many Southeast Asian regional states.
Factors which make Asia Pacific regional states `countries of convenience' for terrorist activists and groups are little different from those that make the region attractive for international organised crime. Small poorly resourced nations with little or no foreign direct investment, poor infrastructure, very rudimentary public administration which is often corrupt, and remote, relatively secure havens from which to conduct activities. As we have seen earlier, criminal activities are regionally spread, and can assist terrorists by providing the support and resources needed to mount effective terrorist activities.
Unsurprisingly, the regional counter-terrorist focus is al Qaeda, the probable penetration of the region, probable support networks, cells, sympathisers, and financial support. Experts of the Monitoring Committee of the UN Security Council, say that despite the freezing/seizure of terrorist funds and other assets worth US $ 112 million since September 11th 2001, al Qaeda and the International Islamic Front still have about US$300 million. A US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimate puts the possible cost to al Qaeda of the attack on the Twin Towers as between $303,672 and $500,00021. al Qaeda is reported to have spent about US $ 1 million ensuring pro-al Qaeda and pro-Taliban candidates won the recent Pakistan elections.
Terrorist groups have been reported to be active in at least Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and are suspected of activities in the small Pacific Island states. Several of these groups have been cited in the media and by politicians as having links with al Qaeda, and several may have links with other movements in the region. In my view it is regrettable that evidence linking al Qaeda to regional terrorists, such as Jamaah Islamiah, many governments claim that they have, is not in the public domain. Regrettable because commentators immediately leap to the conclusion those perpetrators of the reprehensible terrorist attacks the world continues to witness, are Islamist, and probably linked in some way with al Qaeda. Such cursory analysis, which excludes other possibilities, is not only narrow and unhelpful, but also may cloud judgement in planning counter-terrorist procedures and operations. There are regional and international organisations that are not Islamist, and use terror to achieve their aims and objectives (e.g. nationalist, criminal or political). Naturally, these groups may seek technical assistance from al Qaeda, and may receive it, particularly if it serves to further mutual interests.
This said, it is clear that the Asia-Pacific is an important arena for international terrorists, including it seems al Qaeda. In common with al Qaeda, the many regional groups tend to be decentralised and thus difficult to identify and counter, others are less sophisticated and more "traditional" in structure and operations. Some analysts suggest the al Qaeda strength in the Asia Pacific is totals about 5,000, but I suspect the true figure is as elusive as Osama bin Laden himself. Rohan Gunaratna comments on Asia Pacific based terrorists:
Their leaders are handpicked, mostly educated in the Middle East, speak Arabic unlike the vast majority of Asian Muslims, and were already of a radical bent. al Qaeda's Asian core is handpicked from several hundred jihadi volunteers who fought in Afghanistan, including, inter alia, Central Asians, Chinese, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Indonesians, Malaysians, Singaporeans, and Filipinos.22
al Qaeda probably uses Islamic charities and businesses in order to finance activities in the region and further afield. In the southern Philippines, for example it appears that a link exists between al Qaeda and the Abu Sayaaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) organisations. In January this year Singaporean authorities arrested Singaporean nationals linked with Jamaah Islamiah, who planned to build and detonate truck bombs on the island. Targets included the US Embassy, US personnel and other US and Allies installations. Jamaah Islamiah may operate in loose association with other regional groups through a clandestine network of `sleeper cells', offering mutual operational and logistic support.
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19 Bruce HOFFMAN "Inside Terrorism" Victor Golancz, London 1998. P15 "Hence,
unlike terrorism as it is commonly understood today, to mean a revolutionary or anti-
government activity undertaken by non-state or subnational entities, the regime de la
terreur was an instrument of governance wielded by the recently established revolutionary
state."
20 Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism" 29 Jan 1999,"Bin Laden is part of Saudi
Arabia's Sunni opposition. A devout Muslim, he wishes to see the withdrawal of Western
troops from Saudi Arabia, the overthrow of the Saudi regime and its replacement with an
Islamic state under Shari'a law. Bin Laden is widely believed to be a financier of global
Islamic terrorism, with guerillas from his training camps active in Egypt, Ethiopia, the
Philippines, Saudi Arabia and Uganda...he is alleged to have played an instrumental role in
the bombings of the US embassy compounds in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998."
21 FBI Congressional testimony, August 1, 2002
22 Gunatratna, Rohan; Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, Hurst and Co, London,
2002.