Relations between China, the United States, and Japan remain the key factor determining the broad security, and prosperity of the Asia Pacific region. As their ultimate security guarantee, many regional countries still wish to maintain a bilateral relationship with the United States.
The most important security issue in Southeast Asia is concern about the future integrity and stability of Indonesia. The Bali tragedy aside, the archipelago will need continuing substantial levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) and external aid and security support for at least the medium term (5 years +). Failure to maintain Indonesian national cohesion will have severe implications for regional stability.
The regional security and law-enforcement architecture, while less interconnected compared with other regions of the world, is developing. Acting as a sort of "regional sponsor" for this development is the ASEAN Regional Forum, of which the Forum is now a member, progress beyond dialogue and the development of confidence building measures, and towards preventive diplomacy remains slow. On a positive note the ARF has developed some useful basic tools for the management of regional disputes; but remains quite some way from effectively dealing with regional conflicts, international terrorism and organised crime, piracy, human and narcotics smuggling and other illegal trans-border activities. Underpinning the ARF is the Conference for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), a so-called "Track II", or unofficial grouping made up in the main by regional academics and security specialists.
ASEAN (and the ARF) is constrained by the principle of non-interference, and absence of strong leadership. There is tension too about how ASEAN should deal with problems in one country that have implications for regional neighbours. There are signs of strains within ASEAN which not only pose challenges to cohesiveness, but also in allowing it to play a leading role in regional political, economic and security developments. Some members have commented publicly that ASEAN risks becoming a `sunset' organisation8, possibly presaging a new found willingness to discuss "hard" topics. Despite these shortcomings, ASEAN is the only substantial Asia-Pacific organisations. ASEAN remains central to the South East Asian economic and security environment. Events in East Timor have forced countries to take an uncomfortably close interest in the internal security situation of other members. In my view, such interest was set increase even before the Bali bombings, Malacca Strait piracy, trans-national criminal activity, and illegal migration pushed trans-national interests into sharper focus.
An example of this evolution is the ASEAN ministerial communiqué on Terrorism issued on 5th November 2001, and a follow-on meeting at the end of May this year, in which acts of terrorism were unequivocally condemned and a "cohesive and united approach to effectively combat terrorism" was underscored9. This declaration followed immediately the issuing on 17th May of a very detailed ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Trans-national Crime10. It remains to be seen whether or not such lofty pronouncements evolve into meaningful and tangible co-operation in pursuit of the stated outcomes.
Singapore, described once by Lee Kwan Yuw as "a Chinese island in a Muslim sea", continues to play a significant role political and economic role in the region. Singapore is prosperous while many neighbours are not. This causes some friction with Malaysia and Indonesia in particular. Cyclic tensions between Singapore and Malaysia remain, although less tense than in past years. Both states recognise that there are benefits in bi-lateral co-operation, the sort of co-operation resulting in the arrest of Jamaah Islamiah members for example.
Malaysia is of great importance to the future of ASEAN. Malaysia has been in a state of flux for the past 3 years or so with Dr. Mahathir approaching the end of his tenure, but still in firm control. Doubts exist about the ability of his nominated successor, Badawi, to lead the nation with as astutely as Matahir. Malaysia's introversion and pre-occupation with internal events may serve to lessen its important international role. Traditional support for United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) has fallen, replaced by increased support for the main Islamic party, (PAS). If PAS support grows further, this may limit the contact that Malaysia has with the more "westernised" regional states. There are deepening tensions too between Malaysian Islamic groups of "mainstream" Shia, Sunni, and the more fundamentalist sub sects.
Political reform and the reduction of the political influence of the military from politics in Thailand have created a climate, which will enable the nation to better develop and define a robust politico-economic regional role. Elections, described as the dirtiest and most expensive ever, have tarnished this image, and proved a temporary setback. The relationship between Thailand and Myanmar remains uneasy. Drug trafficking and illegal immigration over the porous Myanmar border are targeted as key threats by the Thai security authorities. The Thai government has committed itself to improving relations with Myanmar, but is under international pressure to take a harder line. The Islamic Peoples United Liberation Organisation (PULO) is still active along the Malaysia Thailand border.
Page précédente | Sommaire | Page suivante
8 Singapore Foreign Minister Jayakumar, for example
9 Joint Communique, Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, 20-21 May 2002,
Kuala Lumpur. www.aseansec.org
10 Ibid: includes drug trafficking, trafficking in people, arms smuggling, money
laundering, terrorism, cyber crime, but, oddly, neither piracy nor sea robbery