The PKK and the Kurdish Peshmergas [freedom fighters] of Iraq 

• Massud Barzani, Head of the DPK, in Ankara, February 1992: 
"We completely disapprove of the methods and tactics of the PKK and we have no ties to that organization." 

• "Political Command of the Kurdistan Front" (DPK + PUK), April 1992: Banned the PKK from engaging in any political or military activity in northern Iraq. 

• DPK Representative in Ankara, April 1992: 
The PKK has done a lot of damage to the Kurdish cause. Now people think that Kurds are terrorists. We have always refused to employ these methods." 

• Ankara Representative of the Kurdistan Front (DPK + PUK), September 1992: 
Safin Dizaï and Sarchil Qazzaz: "The PKK is still applying (in Iraqi "Kurdistan") its methods of choice, namely kidnapping and intimidation...despite numerous warnings from the DPK and the PUK." 

• Jalal Talabani, Head of the PUK, "Voice of the People of Kurdistan", October 2, 1992, 4 p.m., GMT: 
"Why is the PKK collaborating with the butcher of the Iraqi Kurds? Why is it cutting Iraqi Kurdistan's supply lines? If the PKK wants armed struggle, let it wage it in Turkish "Kurdistan." Shortly thereafter, a three-week offensive ensued between peshmergas from the "Kurdistan" Front and the PKK's rear bases, along the Turkish border. 

• "Kurdistan” Committee in Bonn, Germany, October 1993: 
This PKK subsidiary accused the DPK of collaborating with the Turkish Army in the latter's operation against the PKK in northern Iraq. 

• Massud Barzani, head of the DPK, July 1995: 
Asked for Ankara's help to prevent PKK raids across the Iraqi-Turkish border.
 
 

Allegiances and Alliances

Since its founding, the PKK has maintained privileged ties with Hafiz al-Asad's Syria, an alliance illustrated by the fact that the PKK leadership settled in Damascus after the 1980 coup in Turkey, then in Syrian-controlled Lebanon in 1987. Because of al-Asad's promises to Turgut Özal (then Prime Minister of Turkey) in 1987, these ties are now somewhat weaker.

Similarly, the PKK has always been on good terms with other movements (guerrilla or terrorist groups) that have been close to Damascus. First and foremost, there have been the Palestinian groups. Around 1972-74, certain elements of the future PKK collaborated with the Special Foreign Operations Command of the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine], led by Wadi Haddad. It was then that future members of the PKK and of ASALA [Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia] first met. The inconvenient fact that 70 percent of "historical Kurdistan" and "historical Armenia" overlap did not prevent the PKK from allying with ASALA in April 1980 in Lebanon. This curious alliance survived the Turkish military operation in northern Iraq in May 1983, enabling ASALA to toughen up its troops in the "PKK liberated zone. "

In 1986-87, reliable sources reported contacts between the PKK (still Marxist-Leninist) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In Lebanon, contacts then became more frequent between PKK cadres and Hizballah. In October 1989, the Turkish press vehemently protested the existence of two PKK camps in Iranian Azerbaijan. Naturally, Tehran self-righteously denied it.

Then there are the ties between the PKK and Saddam Husayn. By September 1989, rumors of a secret alliance between the PKK and the Iraqi Government were gaining enough credence for the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to "deny" them "categorically." Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz denied them again in September 1991. According to the DPK and the PUK, the PKK had been supplying Baghdad with intelligence on the other Kurdish parties since 1988, in exchange for money and weapons. In September 1990, Ocalan openly sided with Saddam Husayn, who "was fighting American imperialism." That strategic choice was confirmed by one of the PKK military leaders, who said at the time: "For us, the important thing is the revolution in the Middle East, and we will fight alongside any revolutionary State or force in the region." He went on to state that the PKK had had contacts with the Iraqi military in the Zakhu region since August 1990. As rumors grew of massive arms shipments from Saddam to the PKK, Ocalan justified himself, in interviews in late 1991, by maintaining that the weapons had been "left behind by the Iraqi Army," and recovered by his men.
 
 
 
                                                                                                    PKK - Saddam: Strong Suspicions 

• The New York Times, October 20, 1991: 
"Turkish officials, Western diplomats, and Kurdish leaders in Iraq say that the Iraqi Government is arming and supplying the Kurdish separatists in southeastern Turkey, undoubtedly in retaliation for the close cooperation between the Turks and the Allied Forces during the Gulf War. 

• "Kayhan” (Islamic fundamentalist) daily, Tehran, April 27, 1992: Interview with Temer Ramadan Kucher, head of the DPK for the city of Zakhu, in Iraqi "Kurdistan": "We suspect that the Iraqi authorities are committing acts of sabotage through the PKK. There are many PKK militants in the region...they get their supplies and intelligence from Baghdad."..."The PKK has bases near Zakhu. Some of its leaders visit Iraqi leaders, who help them."
 
 

Thus the PKK's regional strategy took shape, i.e., never put all your eggs in one basket and take turns playing Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria off against one another. Among the PKK's other dubious contacts in the Mediterranean Basin were those between Ocalan and Muammar Qadhafi:

• June 20, 1995, 11 p.m., GMT, "Voice of the Great Arab Nation," Tripoli, Libya: "In a telegram to the Brother Leader of the Revolution [Qadhafi], brother Abdallah Ocalan, Secretary General of the PKK, affirmed the complete solidarity of the Kurdish people with the Great Jamahiriya, bulwark and beacon of the Arab and Islamic liberation movement, victim of a dastardly Imperialist plot." This "brotherhood" enables the PKK to racketeer with comparative ease among the (wealthy) Kurdish émigré community in Libya.

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