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Two Typical “Degenerate Guerrilla Groups”:

**THE LIBERATION TIGERS
OF TAMIL EELAM
AND
THE KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY**

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"Degenerate Guerrilla Groups": the Concept ¹

*Africa, India, Southeast Asia, Latin America: nothing is left of the heroic glory of the partisans, rebels, and guerrillas. The guerrilla and anti-guerrilla movements, just a short time ago armed to the hilt ideologically and backed by powerful foreign allies, are both on their own from now on. What is left is nothing but an armed rabble. All the liberation armies, national movements, and other self-proclaimed fronts have **degenerated** into bands of marauders, barely distinguishable from their adversaries. The jumble of acronyms in which they array themselves--FLNA or ANLF, MPLA or MLNF--fools no one. There is no target, no plan, no idea to give them consistency, only a strategy barely worthy of the name, one of kidnappings, murder, and plunder. The guerrillas and terrorists of the 1960s and 70s still felt the need to justify themselves. In streams of tracts and proclamations, strict catechisms and manifestos in gobbledygook, they justified their actions on ideological grounds. Today, their successors think that such justification is superfluous. What strikes about them is the absence of any conviction.*

Hans Magnus Enzensberger ²

According to the German Law professor Carl Schmitt's definition, the "partisan"--the irregular, the guerrilla, the mujahid, the resistor, the terrorist--is the quintessential combatant of the cold war era. The ideology of the partisan, the depth of his roots in the movement, the urban or rural milieu in which he operates, the size, mobility, and aggressiveness of his forces are all factors that may vary; but not his political core, which alone distinguishes him from the mercenary or the brigand. During the Cold War, a war of fronts, of positions, the partisan operated in the disputed areas, or, better yet, within the "territory" of either bloc. The rival superpower gave him both the ideological point of reference that shaped his political nature, and the means to fight behind enemy lines. Thus, until June 1989, the bipolar order gave the partisan room to maneuver, and enabled him to advance towards his goal. Does this room still exist in the new world that is emerging? No. The partisan must adapt, or disappear. Consequently, after the fall

¹ : We use the term "degenerate guerrilla groups" because some of them have not taken a criminal course, or have not yet had time to do so. One example would be the Zapatista Indian campesinos of Chiapas, in Mexico.

² : "La grande migration - Vues sur la guerre civile, [The Great Migration: Views on the Civil War], Gallimard - L'infini, 1995.

of the Berlin Wall, the prevailing opinion was that once they fell out of style and were cut off from resources, the guerrillas and partisan forces would quickly collapse.

Today, instead of extinguishing Third World insurrections, the absence of outside support has actually fanned their flames to such an extent that enormous areas have slid into chaos in almost no time. The phenomenon grips countries emerging from serious conflicts, such as Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan, or disintegrating, artificial nation-States such as Somalia and Zaire. Therefore, some Third World guerrilla movements have survived, and even grown, with some or all of the following characteristics:

- An ideology that most often is Maoist and autarkical, advocating "reliance on one's own forces";
- Simultaneous control of sanctuaries (won by force of arms or humanitarian) and of "trading posts" (airports, ports, market towns), either on the coast or having links with the outside world. Following the Lebanese "model" of civil war, the guerrillas turned criminal live as predators off "their" territories and off the local civilian populace, monopolizing the transnational traffic in contraband or controlled commodities, precious woods and stones, ivory, and endangered animal species;
- Establishing control over the diaspora communities settled in the developed world, especially in Europe. The guerrilla groups turned criminal force them to pay a revolutionary tax and in their midst set up networks that engage in clandestine drug trafficking, money laundering, and illegal alien smuggling.
- Finally, these degenerate guerrillas maintain active ties with States hostile to France, or to its friends and allies.

The main "mutant guerrilla groups" are seven in number. Three are Asian, two are Latin American, one is African, and one is from the Near East:

Philippines: *New People's Army*

Sri Lanka: *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam*

India: *Sikh guerrilla movement fighting for an independent "Khalistan"*

Colombia: *Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)*

Peru: *Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)*

Senegal: *Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance*

Middle East: *Kurdistan Worker's Party*

There have been a number of indications that in addition, the Naxalites in India and the Khmer Rouge are engaged in criminal activities. One very symbolic example of this

trend occurred in June 1976, when the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, Francis Meloy, another diplomat, and a driver, were kidnapped and then killed by the Lebanese cohorts of the terrorist Wadi Haddad. In May 1994, one of the killers was found. He was in prison, in Beirut. Arrested in March 1993 in possession of three kilos of heroin, former terrorist Bassam al-Forkh was serving three years there for drug trafficking.

One thing that should be stressed is the extreme harmfulness of these entities, once political but having now turned to crime, yet maintaining their ideological trimmings for public consumption. They are all the more dangerous because they haunt both the world's shadowy no-man's-lands and the large urban centers, in the Third World and in the developed world, particularly the European capitals. They excel in leading a double life: passing themselves off as national liberation movements, while carrying on a profitable drug trafficking operation with the Cosa Nostra, the Triades, or the Turkish mafia.

THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM

The Island of Ceylon, Tamil Eelam, and the "Tigers"

The current population of the island nation of Sri Lanka is 17-18 million inhabitants. In 1981, when the last census was taken, the Buddhist Sinhalese accounted for 74 percent of the population, while the Tamils, most of them Hindu, represented 18.2 percent of the population. The Tamils, in turn, are subdivided into the "Jaffna Tamils" (who have lived on the island since prehistoric times and represent 12.6 percent) and the "plantation Tamils" ("imported" by British colonists and who make up 5.6 percent). Finally, the Muslims (7.4 percent) and other assorted groups (approximately 0.4 percent) complete the picture of the Sri Lankan population.

In Ceylon, as they did everywhere in the old days, the British played an industrious minority (the Tamils) off against the Sinhalese majority resistant to the colonial order. Consequently, when the country became independent (1947), the Sinhalese instituted a de facto system of discrimination in government employment, banks, teaching, etc., since they viewed the Tamils as "accomplices of the colonists."

In the early 70s, young Tamils, fired up by the revolutionary tracts of Mao Zedong, "Che" Guevara, and Régis Debray, launched a "protracted people's war," the aim of

which was to establish a Tamil national homeland in the north-east of the island. They named their dream nation "Tamil Eelam." The second word is the ancient Tamil name for the whole island of Ceylon. Tamil Eelam is therefore that part of the island historically inhabited by the Tamils (who now number 2.5 to 3 million).

The other side of the Palk Strait (in reality, a channel, barely 30-km wide), which separates northern Ceylon from India, contains the "strategic heartland" of the Sri Lankan Tamil separatists: their brethren, the people of the Indian state of Tamil Nadu (now numbering approximately 60 million). The pro-independence Tamils of Ceylon have numerous sympathizers in Tamil Nadu, and from Madras, they have ready access to the sizable overseas Tamil communities in Asia, North America, and Europe. In France, for example, the Tamil community numbered approximately 60,000 in the early 1990s.

The "Tigers"

Initially named the "Tamil New Tigers," the "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" (LTTE) were founded in 1972 by Velupillai Prabhakaran, only 17-years old, born into Karaiyar, a lower caste of fishermen and fishmongers in northern Ceylon. The LTTE was founded as a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist organization dedicated to the brutal eradication of the caste system in the Tamil community and to the waging of a "protracted people's war" in order to create a sovereign Tamil State on Ceylon. In terms of ideology and methods, the LTTE closely resembles the Khmer Rouge of the Pol Pot era.

The Tigers have held a liberated area in northeastern Ceylon since 1987, namely the Jaffna peninsula, approximately 1,000 km², home to between 700,000 and 800,000 Tamils. Before the civil war, Jaffna was the second largest urban center on the island. The Tigers also have a deep-water port on their territory: Point Pedro.

The "Army" of the Tigers is without a doubt the deadliest guerrilla group in the world. According to some sources, its forces are estimated to have 6,000 to 10,000 combatants. Over the years, the Tigers have received aid from other extremist movements. Among the Palestinians, one notable source has been George Habash's PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine]. According to Ulanath Thamilar, an LTTE periodical published in Toronto, Canada, the war was costing the Tigers approximately \$ 1,6 million per month in 1992, i.e., about \$ 20 million per year. That Spring, the Tigers were trying to collect \$ 20 million from 10,000 families living in the liberated areas in

order to purchase and equip high-speed attack craft at \$ 1 million per unit, for the "Sea Tigers, their "navy."

The LTTE have also created dauntingly effective suicide commando units--the "Black Tigers" (Karma Puligal in Tamil, see below). Furthermore, according to the Indian intelligence community, the LTTE now have ULMs and high-speed patrol craft at their disposal. They are said to be trying to procure some midget submarines, drones, and gliders for the Black Tigers' suicide operations. They have also reportedly purchased sophisticated on-board radar systems for their "navy."

Finally, in September 1994, the Tigers issued a press release in Great Britain threatening to put arsenic into Ceylon tea, produced by members of the Sinhalese majority loyal to the regime in Colombo.

The LTTE, terrorism, and “human bombs”

Question: *Mr. Prabhakaran, people say that all your combatants wear a cyanide capsule around their necks: is this just nonsense?*

V. Prabhakaran: *No, it is the truth. It has been our rule right from the very start. A number of our comrades have given their lives in this way. But it does ensure that practically none of us are taken prisoner...By doing this, our fighters protect those who help us...The cyanide capsule is the symbol of our determination... It gives us the strength to sacrifice our lives for our cause.*

The Hindu, Madras, September 5, 1986

First of all, one awesome fact stands out: in the history of the world, no other guerrilla outfit--whether turned criminal or still faithful to their original ideals--no other terrorist group has succeeded in assassinating a chief of State (Ramasinghe Premadasa, Sri Lanka) and a figure of political stature comparable to that of Rajiv Gandhi, heir of an illustrious Indian dynasty, head of the opposition movement at the time of his death, and former prime minister of the "world's largest democracy," and all this outside territory under its direct control. Worse yet, between 1989 and 1994, the LTTE assassinated all their major enemies, without ever claiming responsibility for any of these crimes, and even indulging in the luxury of denying any involvement in this unprecedented series of murders and massacres.

July 1989: Appapilai Amirthalingam and Vettivelu Yogeswaran, two leaders of the Tamil United Liberation Front (moderates) were shot in their homes.

March 1991: Sri Lankan Defense Minister Ranjan Wijeratne died in a car-bomb explosion.

May 1991: Rajiv Gandhi attended a political rally in the city of Sriperumbudur, in Indian Tamil Nadu, near Madras. As a young lady prepared to place a garland around his neck, she set off a belt of 2.5 kilos of C4 that she had been wearing under her sari. Twenty people were blown to bits, including Rajiv and the terrorist, of whom only her head was found, along with the cyanide tablet that she was wearing around her neck, the Tigers' trademark. In August 1991, in the Indian city of Bangalore, the police surrounded the masterminds behind R. Gandhi's murder. The 11 Tigers all committed suicide by taking cyanide, except for the head of the group, Raja Arumainayam, whom the police gunned down. During the Spring of 1992, the Indian federal criminal investigation service charged Velupillai Prabhakaran with the murder of R. Gandhi, along with the head of the LTTE special services. The Indian courts then issued a 49-page document, with 400-pages of annexes, showing the Tigers' direct responsibility for the act. Rajiv Gandhi had paid for his "betrayal" of the Tigers during the intervention of the Indian peace force in Sri Lanka (1987-90).

November 1992: The head of the Sri Lankan Navy, Vice Admiral Clancey Fernando, was assassinated by a suicide bomber on a motorcycle, who set off a heavy plastic charge upon impact.

April 1993: The head of the Sri Lankan opposition (Democratic United National Front), Lalith Athulathmudali, 57 years old, fell to an assassin's bullet not far from Colombo, during an election rally. The killer, Kandiah Rangunathan, a 25-year-old Jaffna Tamil, committed suicide by swallowing cyanide shortly after the attack. Athulathmudali had been in charge of the campaign against the Tigers when he was Minister of National Security from 1987 to 1991.

May 1993: Ramasinghe Premadasa, 68 years old, President of Sri Lanka since December 1988, was assassinated, along with 16 members of his military staff, while attending a May Day parade. The perpetrator of this massacre was Kulaweeringham Veerakumar, age 14, a Jaffna Tamil. Just as in the Rajiv Gandhi killing, all that was found of the terrorist was his head and his cyanide tablet. Premadasa had paid for his aborted attempt to effect a rapprochement with the Tigers.

October 1994: Gamini Dissanayake, candidate for the (conservative) United National Party in the presidential election, and an opponent of dialogue with the Tigers, attended a meeting not far from Colombo. In what was to be a replay of the Gandhi killing, a young woman, one Mrs. Pushpalamar, unleashed a bloodbath by setting off an explosive device in the front row of the hall. The toll was 57 fatalities, including the candidate, and 200 wounded. In the terrorist's handbag was a cyanide pill tied to the end of a shoelace and a photo of the candidate. The husband of the "human bomb," one Mr. Ravindran, like her a Jaffna Tamil, was implicated in planning the murder of R. Premadasa.

December 1994: Karavai Kandasamy, a former Tamil guerrilla who had given up armed struggle and became a harsh critic of the LTTE and deputy chairman of a moderate party was gunned down not far from his Colombo home.

The Tigers and Drug Trafficking

*As for the ties that exist between the heroin trafficking rings and the Tamil terrorist movements, it should be noted that in numerous court investigations, information was uncovered and a documents captured suggesting that the drug traffickers and the Tamil separatists work hand in glove. In one notable case, in May 1986, during the arrest in the Paris region of the leaders of the "Tamil Coordinating Committee," who had become mixed up in drug trafficking, investigators uncovered a relationship with the "**Liberation Tigers**," one of the armed wings of the Tamil resistance movement to the Sinhalese regime."*

French Narcotics Squad Report, May 25, 1987

Given the extent of the heroin trafficking in which they have engaged since 1982, and the cold-bloodedness with which they "manage" their supply routes and networks, the Tamil separatists are still the pioneers. But at the time, no one was really all that concerned. Organizations that supposedly were politically legitimate, fighting for the noblest of ideals, the liberation of a people, importing tons of heroin into Europe over a period of at least five years? *Le Monde* (July 31, 1985) simply noted that "this traffic sometimes has political overtones." As for the specialized international agencies, they quite simply did not wish to know. "INTERPOL or the United Nations Office at Vienna's Division of Narcotic Drugs have no authority to delve into it (the "political" nature of drug trafficking, editor's note). For them, the Sri Lankan connection amounts to nothing more than a mere 1,500 or so kilos of heroin imported into Europe in 1984 alone³.

And yet as early as 1982, the customs services of countries situated along the periphery of Western Europe had started reporting seizures of Pakistani "brown sugar," in 3- to 10-kilo amounts, from Sri Lankan Tamils. These are always poor wretches, whom the press quickly dubbed "drug-trafficking kamikazes," or even the "skilled workers" of the drug trade. The invasion of these "coolies" reached the heart of Europe in 1983 and the following year, INTERPOL estimated that the Sri Lankan connection was responsible for importing 1.5 tons of heroin into Europe, an enormous amount for that time, when a seizure of 10 kilos of "powder" made the front pages. That year, 135 kilos of heroin were seized in Europe and 241 Ceylonese Tamils were arrested there, 89 of them in France.

As for the supply routes, the "kamikazes" always set out from Colombo, Madras, or Bombay. The heroin originally came from the "Golden Crescent," which explains the frequent stopovers in Karachi, Pakistan, by the couriers. An alternate route of the Eastern connection ran through the USSR and East Berlin, then West Berlin, and finally into France or the Netherlands. Another Eastern connection was via Syria, where the Tigers had friends among the Palestinian extremists, Tunisia, and finally southern Europe, France, or Italy. In the latter country, the Tamil separatists had valuable contacts in Rome, but also in Naples, Catania, and Palermo, where there are Tamil émigré communities. Another channel ran through the Canary Islands and Spain.

In 1985, 645 Jaffna Tamil smugglers were arrested in Europe, carrying 93 kilos of heroin, in West Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain (Madrid, Barcelona, Las Palmas in the Canary Islands), France (Paris, Marseilles), Great Britain, Greece, Italy

³ :Laurent Greilsamer, *Le Monde*, July 31, 1985.

(Rome, Naples, Palermo, Catania), Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland. Still others were arrested in Yugoslavia and Tunisia. Clearly, the invasion of Europe was massive and systematic.

September-October 1984: Dozens of Jaffna Tamils, living 10 or 15 to a ghetto apartment, were arrested in and around Rome holding significant amounts of heroin. One gruesome detail was that these illiterate smugglers, lacking any kind of identification documents, and able to scribble only "their" name and date of birth, often had had their tongues cut out--a foolproof method of ensuring their permanent silence.

October 1984: A Jaffna Tamil arrived at London's Heathrow Airport carrying 2.5 kilos of heroin. He confessed to selling drugs for the Tigers.

February 1985: Several Jaffna Tamils were arrested in Pierrefitte, Seine Saint-Denis, carrying five kilos of heroin.

March 1985: Interrogations from the previous fall led to the unravelling of one ring. In the greater Rome area, a network of Jaffna Tamils, headed by Selliah Pushpathillainathan (25 years old) and Mylvaganam Thevendraraja (28 years old), was arrested in possession of significant amounts of "brown sugar." In Naples, one Durairajah Prabhakaran, who was carrying three kilos of brown sugar, was picked-up. One of his accomplices, had seven kilos of the drug. In Catania, Sicily, a group of Jaffna Tamils had 15 kilos of heroin. These police raids made possible the seizure of a number of pieces of propaganda and internal documents of the LTTE, in addition to 40 kilos of heroin, several million deutsche marks, etc. On March 16, 1985, the Italian courts indicted these individuals and 33 of their cohorts, ages 20 to 30, for "criminal conspiracy to commit international drug trafficking," forgery, and use of falsified official documents, etc. In the March 19, 1985 issue of L'Espresso~ the Government Attorney of Rome, Luciano Infelisi, emphasized that "these individuals act out of political conviction...their profits were used to buy weapons." The investigation also revealed that these Tamils are in close contact with the Camorra (Naples) and the Cosa Nostra (Catania and Palermo). These organizations, bound by the code of silence called omerta, were no doubt highly impressed by the infallible silence of the smugglers with the cut-out tongues.

October 1985: The narcotics squad arrests some dozen Tamils in a house in Seine-et-Marne, in possession of 10 kilos of heroin. All told, 60 Sri Lankan Tamils were questioned, including 9 ring leaders. Most of them were "political refugees." That same month, the trial of eight Jaffna Tamils, including one woman, was held in Paris. They, too, had received "political" asylum. One of the defendants, a Mr. Rajaratnam,

confessed that his group belonged to the LTTE, and that the trafficking was for the Tiger's benefit. The money brought in was sent to "Kumar," another Tiger living in Bombay, India.

Finally, in June 1986, a network of Jaffna Tamils was dismantled in Sarcelles. The ringleaders, Messrs. Chandrakhumarran and Vellutylul, were also leaders of the "Tamil Coordinating Committee in France," a front association in which the Tigers ran the show.

Since then, the Tamil narco-terrorists have forged ahead, albeit more cautiously. But as recently as 1993, OCTRIS [Central Office for Halting Illegal Narcotics Trafficking] and the Strasbourg SRPJ [Regional Office of the Judiciary Police] dismantled a Sri Lankan heroin-trafficking ring between France, the Netherlands, and Spain. Police surveillance revealed that seven Sri Lankan Tamils, led by J.E. Srilandjarah (who was working as a sales clerk in a Latin Quarter bookstore) had imported 8.2 kilos of Indian heroin into France between October 1992 and March 1993.

The Tigers and Human Rights

On October 17, 1994, the New York Times pointed out the similarity between the Tigers and the Khmer Rouge, based on observations in the Jaffna liberated area. The Tigers' regime was "brutal" and aroused "intense fear among the local populace." They waged "ethnic warfare" and practiced "arbitrary arrests and torture." "Kidnapping and murder" were their everyday tricks of the trade. Furthermore, they had mobilized an "army of 11- and 12-year-old children" for their war of liberation. In June 1994, even the monthly Echo of Islam, published in Teheran, normally very friendly to any group that resembled a liberation movement, settled the Tigers' case in one sentence, labeling them a "fascist and racist organization." It should be noted that the Tigers' record is a very long one. Among the world's countries, throughout the 1980s Sri Lanka ranked a steady second (after El Salvador) in terms of the number of victims of political violence in proportion to the overall population.

Ethnic Cleansing: There are 1.2 million Muslims, either Tamil or Sinhalese converts, in Sri Lanka, and their situation is rather like that of the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A third of them live in the northeastern part of the island, which the Tigers regard as Tamil Eelam. Partly out of a sense of tradition and partly out of fear of the Tamil separatists, the Sri Lankan Muslims are on rather close terms with the regime in Colombo. Hence the ethnic cleansing waged by the Tigers for more than a decade. Without beating around the bush this time, LTTE Secretary General Yogaratnam Yogi has repeatedly stated that the Muslims were "traitors" and justified the massacres.

In August 1990, in the village of Kattankudy, and one week later, in the village of Eravum, a total of 313 Muslim men, women, and children were massacred in two mosques, at prayer time. In October 1990, 190 Muslims, half of them women and children, were massacred in the province of Batticaloa, eastern Sri Lanka. Hundreds were wounded, 120 were widowed. In April 1992, 56 Muslims were massacred in Alingipothana. All told, in the 10 years between 1984 and 1994, 103 Muslim villages were attacked, plundered, and burned by the Tigers, leaving a death toll of nearly 2,800. In late May 1995, 150 to 200 Tigers massacred 44 Sinhalese and Muslims in a fishing village in northeastern Sri Lanka.

In June 1995, the Tigers demanded that 60,000 Muslims leave the city of Kattankudy, a port in the eastern province of Batticaloa, where the Muslims were the majority. The LTTE had already massacred 140 unarmed Muslims in that same city in August 1990. In late July, the LTTE threatened to massacre any Muslims who refused to evacuate the city of Puttalam (27,000 inhabitants in the eastern province).

Eliminating the Competition: between 1986 and 1987, all Tamil revolutionary and separatist groups other than the Tigers were annihilated and their militants integrated into the ranks of the LTTE, after "re-education." The groups included the following:

- People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE);
- Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO);
- Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS);
- Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF);
- Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF).

In 1986, the entire political leadership of TELO was murdered. As recently as 1990, an LTTE commando massacred 13 leaders of a rival group seeking refuge in Tamil Nadu.

Stalinist-Maoist Practices: a Random Sampling. Until late 1994, the guerrillas mobilized children of ages 13 and up. Since then, it has been children of ages 11 and up. There have been public executions in Jaffna, and the bullet-riddled bodies of the "traitors" have then been strung up on lamp posts. There are concentration camps in the liberated area, like the one at Mattuvil, set aside for approximately 500 militants, but also for the daughters and wives of "deviationists." There, like the Khmer Rouge, female guards, often less than 14 years old, from the "Birds of Liberation," (the LTTE women's organization), mistreat, torture, and sometimes kill female prisoners, or use them as prostitutes for Tigers out on a spree. It should be pointed out that all of this information comes from testimony gathered and pieced together by impartial humanitarian associations based in Sri Lanka. For example, in July 1995, the Association of University Professors for Human Rights, a highly regarded Tamil NGO,

accused the Tigers of recruiting children as soldiers and then using them as "cannon fodder."

THE KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY [PKK]

"It has been established that the PKK now has the perfect arrangement to produce, transport, and traffic in opiates and cannabis throughout Europe. Moreover, material evidence and intelligence sources have shown that the PKK is also engaging in laundering money from drug trafficking. The funds thus recovered are then funneled back into that terrorist organization."

United States Department of Justice
Drug Enforcement Administration

*Confidential investigative report of June 23, 1995,
distributed to all DEA offices in Europe and Pakistan.*

“Kurdistan” and the Kurds of Turkey and Iraq

The Kurdish cultural area covers a mountainous region (Taurus and Zagros Mountains), divided among the following States:

Turkey: approximately 12 million Kurds (out of 58 million Turkish citizens);

Iran (northwestern): approximately 6 million (out of a total population of 56 million),

Iraq (northern): approximately 4 million (out of a total population of 18 million);

Syria (northern): approximately 800,000 Kurds (out of a total population of 13 million);

Former USSR (mostly in Armenia): approximately 500,000;

Lebanon: approximately 70,000 to 100,000.

Of the above, between 600,000 and 700,000 are refugees or immigrants in Europe.

In other words, according to the sources, there are between 20 million and 24 million Kurds, which makes them the fourth largest ethnic group in the entire Middle East/Southwest Asia region, after the Arabs, Turks, and Persians. These Indo-Europeans are mostly Sunni Muslims, with Twelver Shiite, Alawite, Christian, and Yazidi minorities. Because they have split into a mosaic of tribes and clans, which, to

this day, have been incapable of lasting unity and are often rent by fierce vendettas, the Kurds, whom even Genghis Khan and Hülagü were unable to subdue, have, over the course of their history, suffered mistreatment, to say the least, throughout the region. As a Kurdish intellectual has said: "for us, every valley is a different nation, another country." Today, for example, the Kurds of Turkey use the Roman alphabet, while those of Iran, and of Syria and Iraq, use the Persian and Arabic alphabets, respectively.

In Turkey alone, home to 47 ethnic or religious minorities, the "Kurdish" ethnic group includes tribes and clans of Kurds proper, who generally speak Turkish, and, often, Kermanji or Kurmandzhi. These tribes are generally Sunni Muslims, though some are Alawite (Alavi) or Yazidi, or even Christian (Assyrian [Nestorian] Church). But there are also the Zaza tribes, who are Sunni or Alavi, speak Zaza, unintelligible to Kermanji speakers, and whose Kurdish identity is questioned by a number of experts.

The Politico-Military Organizations of the Iraqi Kurds

First and foremost is the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK), founded by Mustafa Barzani and involved in a guerrilla warfare since the late 1960s. Today it is headed by his son, Massud. Next, there is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), headed by Jalal Talabani. In terms of military forces, field presence, alliances, etc., these organizations are easily more powerful than the PKK.

The Algiers Agreement (1975) between Saddam Husayn and the Shah of Iran, which primarily concerned the sharing of the waters of the Shatt al-Arab, virtually put an end to the military assistance of imperial Iran, and the United States, to Barzani. This aid, copious since early 1974, had enabled Mustafa Barzani's fighters to liberate much of their land in Iraq. The cut-off of aid from Iran forced them to quit their "safe havens" and caused a rift within the Kurdish movement, which led to the creation of the PUK.

In the beginning, the PKK was half-heartedly allied with the DPK. A split occurred at the time of the first "village guards" massacre committed in Turkish "Kurdistan." But in Spring 1987, an agreement was reached (heavy weapons shipments, etc.) between the Iranian Government and Jalal Talabani's PUK. A year later, a rapprochement (once again, purely of convenience) was announced between the PKK and the PUK. A Kurdish Islamic Fundamentalist movement then appeared, first in Iraq, where the Islamic revolutionary press of Tehran spread the news about the activities of an "Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan" (IMIK), formerly called "Hizballah of Kurdistan." The same Islamic Fundamentalist newspapers reported the (sporadic) activities of an "Islamic Party of Kurdistan" and of the Kurdish "Guardians of the Faith."

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)

The PKK traces its origins to the wave of Maoism that spread over Turkey, like the rest of Europe, around the late-1960s. Since the 1970s, the young Turkish "Maoists" have belonged either to the combatant Communist organizations, such as "Revolutionary Left," (DEV SOL)⁴, or to other groups that promote Kurdish nationalist demands, while remaining Marxist-Leninist. The founders of the PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, or Kurdistan Workers' Party) were part of that trend. With its bloodthirsty methods, crude Leninism tinged with nationalist, leader worship, ferocity both within the ranks and towards outsiders, peasant base, and rural guerrilla warfare, the PKK bore a striking resemblance to Abimael "Gonzalo" Guzman's Sendero Luminoso.

Abdallah "Apo" Ocalan has been at the helm of the PKK from the start. His goal is to create the Kurdish equivalent of the Turkish Maoist movements, with equally strict Marxist-Leninism, and then to rid the Kurdish people of their traditional tribal system and to establish an independent Communist Kurdish State, not only in Turkey but in Iraq, Iran, and Syria as well.

The PKK militants (not including emigrants) are usually young (between 18 and 25 years old), and have had little or no education. They are shepherds, blue collar workers, farm laborers, unemployed. "Recruited," often willingly, though sometimes by force, these young people are taken to Lebanon, via Syria, or to the lawless areas in northern Iraq, then trained in guerrilla warfare at Party camps. Other PKK "military" bases have recently been identified in Iran (five, not far from the Turkish border), as have others along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border (see below).

On a more political level, the PKK established a full-fledged National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (Eniya Rizgariya Nelewa Kurdistan, or ERNK) in 1984. Also presided over by Ocalan, the ERNK's main base is in Athens, where its official spokesman lives. Aside from the PKK, it is supposed to include "patriotic" associations in Europe, Iran, and in Syria. In reality, however, the ERNK has not taken any customers away from the other Kurdish movements. On the front lines, the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (Artesa Rizgariya Nelewa Kurdistan, or ARGK) wages the armed struggle. The use of the term "People's Liberation Army" clearly reveals a Maoist influence.

⁴ : *Most of the combatant Communist organization leaders of the 1970s were also Kurds themselves: Deniz Gezmiş (THKP-C); Mahir Cayan (THKO) [Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Ordusu = Turkish People's Liberation Army]; and Ibrahim Kaypakkaya (TKP-ML/TIKKO) [Turkiye Komunist Partisi - Marksist-Leninist/ Turkiye Issi Koylu Kurtulus Ordusu - Turkish Marxist-Leninist Communist Party/Turkish Worker Peasant Liberation Army], for example.*

The Armed Wing of the PKK and the Guerrilla Campaign in Turkey

According to reliable regional experts, as of late 1993, the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan had between 7,000 and 10,000 guerrillas, variously armed, divided among southeastern Anatolia and several bases in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and, now, in the Caucasus, along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. In the beginning (1980-84), the PKK's armed wing had only approximately 500 men, equipped with an odd assortment of light weaponry, based in Syria and Lebanon. Since then, however, the ARGK has built itself up significantly. By way of example, according to reliable sources, in 1992 the "Mahsum Korkmaz Military Academy" in al-Hulwah (in Lebanon, now closed) was training 300 to 400 PKK "recruits" every three months.

Commandos, consisting of several dozen guerrillas, leave the ARGK's foreign bases to infiltrate isolated areas in southeastern Anatolia, sometimes more than 300 km away. Once ensconced in remote mountain areas, the guerrilla unit approaches the peasants in the nearby villages, and, by fair means or foul, gains their support. From their bases, the guerrillas stage attacks on patrols, economic targets, etc. Once the seeds of instability have been sown, the situation heats up and the PKK exploits the reaction of the military or the police in the region:

- Psychologically, by trying to sway the mountain peoples, who are caught between a rock and a hard place, into the guerrilla camp;
- For its foreign propaganda value, by presenting, particularly in Western Europe, all the war damage suffered by the civilian populace, including the atrocities of the guerrilla campaign itself, as human rights abuses perpetrated by the Turkish military, police, and gendarmes.

How Representative is the PKK of the Kurds in Turkey and of the World Kurdish Community?

According to a 1992 Gallup poll to determine whether "the PKK represents the Kurds of Turkey?," 28 percent of the nationwide sample in Turkey answered "yes." In the 20 provinces that make up "Turkish Kurdistan," 29 percent answered "yes."

Voting statistics also provide interesting data. In the 1989 local elections, in which the PKK gave no orders for blank ballots, 80 percent of the voters of "Turkish Kurdistan" (naturally, no distinction is possible between Turks and Kurds) actually voted. Only five percent of them turned in blank ballots. In the 1994 local elections, the PKK issued a public appeal for a boycott, or, at least, for blank ballots, and threatened to retaliate against those who refused to cooperate.

Of the approximately 4.6 million registered voters in "Turkish Kurdistan," the results were as follows: 88 percent of the voters went to the polls in the region. Fifteen percent of those turned in blank ballots. The statistics for several large cities are as follows: in Diyarbakir, voter turnout was 79.86, and 7.8 percent of the ballots were blank; in Hakkâri, voter turnout was 89.4 percent, with 7.8 percent blank ballots; and in Sirnak, turnout was 74.54 percent, with 8.3 percent blank ballots. Thus, assuming the number of registered voters remained fairly constant between 1989 and 1994, it would appear that the PKK's orders did have an impact, at least in terms of blank ballots, on approximately 423,500 voters in southeastern Anatolia.

In July 1995, Professor Dogu Ergil, a highly respected faculty member at Ankara's School of Political Science, published a study on the "Eastern Question," financed and distributed with Turkish private sector funding (Union of Trade Associations and Exchanges). It contained an opinion poll conducted in "Turkish Kurdistan" and in the big cities in Turkey that have a large Kurdish presence. The study reveals the following:

- 65 percent of the respondents speak a Kurdish dialect at home, 21 percent in public;
- 85 percent oppose a Kurdish State independent of Turkey; 15 percent think such a State would be "useful or necessary";
- 4.2 percent of the sample said that the Turkish State must negotiate with the PKK;
- Of the 15 percent who support a Kurdish State in Turkey, only 9.4 percent feel the PKK should be the *only* group involved in talks with the Turkish State.

Finally, in Hakkâri and Sirnak Provinces, there are large Kurdish tribes that are hostile to the PKK, particularly the Jirki, Gevdan, Mamguran, Giravi, and Goran, whose men often serve as "village guards."

Finally, during the Spring 1995 Turkish offensive in northern Iraq, Ocalan himself admitted that there was no love lost between the number one Kurdish movement in Iraq and the PKK. "The Democratic Party of Kurdistan" is currently serving as a scout for enemy military units. It tells them our positions..."⁵

⁵ : *Al-Wasat*, London, quoted in *Courrier International*, April 27, 1995.

The PKK and the Kurdish Peshmergas [freedom fighters] of Iraq

• **Massud Barzani, Head of the DPK, in Ankara, February 1992:**

"We completely disapprove of the methods and tactics of the PKK and we have no ties to that organization."

• **"Political Command of the Kurdistan Front" (DPK + PUK), April 1992:** Banned the PKK from engaging in any political or military activity in northern Iraq.

• **DPK Representative in Ankara, April 1992:**

The PKK has done a lot of damage to the Kurdish cause. Now people think that Kurds are terrorists. We have always refused to employ these methods."

• **Ankara Representative of the Kurdistan Front (DPK + PUK), September 1992:**

Safin Dizai and Sarchil Qazzaz: "The PKK is still applying (in Iraqi "Kurdistan") its methods of choice, namely kidnapping and intimidation...despite numerous warnings from the DPK and the PUK."

• **Jalal Talabani, Head of the PUK, "Voice of the People of Kurdistan", October 2, 1992, 4 p.m., GMT:**

"Why is the PKK collaborating with the butcher of the Iraqi Kurds? Why is it cutting Iraqi Kurdistan's supply lines? If the PKK wants armed struggle, let it wage it in Turkish "Kurdistan." Shortly thereafter, a three-week offensive ensued between peshmergas from the "Kurdistan" Front and the PKK's rear bases, along the Turkish border.

• **"Kurdistan" Committee in Bonn, Germany, October 1993:**

This PKK subsidiary accused the DPK of collaborating with the Turkish Army in the latter's operation against the PKK in northern Iraq.

• **Massud Barzani, head of the DPK, July 1995:**

Asked for Ankara's help to prevent PKK raids across the Iraqi-Turkish border.

Allegiances and Alliances

Since its founding, the PKK has maintained privileged ties with Hafiz al-Asad's Syria, an alliance illustrated by the fact that the PKK leadership settled in Damascus after the 1980 coup in Turkey, then in Syrian-controlled Lebanon in 1987. Because of al-Asad's promises to Turgut Özal (then Prime Minister of Turkey) in 1987, these ties are now somewhat weaker.

Similarly, the PKK has always been on good terms with other movements (guerrilla or terrorist groups) that have been close to Damascus. First and foremost, there have been the Palestinian groups. Around 1972-74, certain elements of the future PKK collaborated with the Special Foreign Operations Command of the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine], led by Wadi Haddad. It was then that future members of the PKK and of ASALA [Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia] first met. The inconvenient fact that 70 percent of "historical Kurdistan" and "historical Armenia" overlap did not prevent the PKK from allying with ASALA in April 1980 in

Lebanon. This curious alliance survived the Turkish military operation in northern Iraq in May 1983, enabling ASALA to toughen up its troops in the "PKK liberated zone. "

In 1986-87, reliable sources reported contacts between the PKK (still Marxist-Leninist) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In Lebanon, contacts then became more frequent between PKK cadres and Hizballah. In October 1989, the Turkish press vehemently protested the existence of two PKK camps in Iranian Azerbaijan. Naturally, Tehran self-righteously denied it.

Then there are the ties between the PKK and Saddam Husayn. By September 1989, rumors of a secret alliance between the PKK and the Iraqi Government were gaining enough credence for the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to "deny" them "categorically." Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz denied them again in September 1991. According to the DPK and the PUK, the PKK had been supplying Baghdad with intelligence on the other Kurdish parties since 1988, in exchange for money and weapons. In September 1990, Ocalan openly sided with Saddam Husayn, who "was fighting American imperialism." That strategic choice was confirmed by one of the PKK military leaders, who said at the time: "For us, the important thing is the revolution in the Middle East, and we will fight alongside any revolutionary State or force in the region." He went on to state that the PKK had had contacts with the Iraqi military in the Zakhu region since August 1990. As rumors grew of massive arms shipments from Saddam to the PKK, Ocalan justified himself, in interviews in late 1991, by maintaining that the weapons had been "left behind by the Iraqi Army," and recovered by his men.

PKK - Saddam: Strong Suspicions

• *The New York Times*, October 20, 1991:

"Turkish officials, Western diplomats, and Kurdish leaders in Iraq say that the Iraqi Government is arming and supplying the Kurdish separatists in southeastern Turkey, undoubtedly in retaliation for the close cooperation between the Turks and the Allied Forces during the Gulf War.

• *"Kayhan" (Islamic fundamentalist) daily, Tehran, April 27, 1992*: Interview with Temer Ramadan Kucher, head of the DPK for the city of Zakhu, in Iraqi "Kurdistan": "We suspect that the Iraqi authorities are committing acts of sabotage through the PKK. There are many PKK militants in the region...they get their supplies and intelligence from Baghdad..." "The PKK has bases near Zakhu. Some of its leaders visit Iraqi leaders, who help them."

Thus the PKK's regional strategy took shape, i.e., never put all your eggs in one basket and take turns playing Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria off against one another. Among the PKK's other dubious contacts in the Mediterranean Basin were those between Ocalan and Muammar Qadhafi:

• *June 20, 1995, 11 p.m., GMT, "Voice of the Great Arab Nation," Tripoli, Libya*: "In a telegram to the Brother Leader of the Revolution [Qadhafi], brother Abdallah Ocalan,

Secretary General of the PKK, affirmed the complete solidarity of the Kurdish people with the Great Jamahiriya, bulwark and beacon of the Arab and Islamic liberation movement, victim of a dastardly Imperialist plot." This "brotherhood" enables the PKK to racketeer with comparative ease among the (wealthy) Kurdish émigré community in Libya.

Activities of the PKK in Europe and the Balkans

Since its founding, the PKK has had what it views as two equally important objectives, i.e., to implant the armed struggle in "Turkish Kurdistan," and to establish themselves in Western Europe. In 1984, the resumption of guerrilla warfare in "Turkish Kurdistan" was accompanied by a violent PKK offensive in Europe, including within its own ranks. It was then that the PKK undertook a ruthless campaign to restore discipline, intimidating or eliminating "collaborators" with Turkey and its own defectors. Because of this, since 1984, 18 PKK militants have been expelled from a Sweden that is otherwise generous in terms of political asylum. In Sweden, Switzerland, Germany,

Associations linked with the PKK in Western Europe (1994)			
Austria:	10	Italy:	2
Belgium:	6	Netherlands:	12
Denmark:	9	Spain:	2
France:	23	Sweden:	20
Germany:	178	Switzerland:	13
Great Britain:	10	Others:	22
Greece:	6	Total:	313

Denmark, and France, murder and arson claimed some twenty lives between 1985 and 1987⁶.

Germany: The Prime Target

The objective of this maneuver was to control throughout Europe the sizable community of Kurdish immigrants and refugees from Turkey. There are actually more than 600,000 of them, of whom 400,000 to 450,000 are in Germany. Moreover, it was there that the PKK set up its central offices ("European Front"), under the name "ERNK - Mission in Europe," legally, at first, then, since its dissolution in November 1993, clandestinely. According to the German Interior Minister, in 1987, the PKK had about a thousand active militants in Germany. This was in addition to numerous satellite

⁶ : The "sentences" are handed down by the "People's Revolutionary Tribunal" of the PKK and carried out by a "Special Operations Group." The most recent of these known murders took place in 1993 in Germany and in 1991 in France. The PKK also engages in kidnapping and torture.

structures: ERNK, a Kurdish patriotic workers's union, youth associations, women's associations, etc., not to mention a formidable "security, control, and intelligence" service. At that time they had offices in Cologne, which served as not only their "capital" but as that of the Turkish Islamic fundamentalists as well, and in Mainz, Offenburg, Russelsheim, Oldenburg, Dortmund, and other cities⁷. Starting at that time, Germany was divided into five regions, then into 17 districts, and finally into neighborhood sections, each with a designated leader. Today, the PKK is reported to have more than 7,000 activists in Germany, out of a pool of sympathizers estimated at 50,000, i.e., 10 percent of the Kurdish community. According to a report published by Germany's domestic security agency (the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) [Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz or BfV] in August 1995, in 1994 the PKK took in some DM30 million (approximately FF103 million) from racketeering of every sort.

The PKK is on the scene in northern Europe:

- In France (which has, according to sources, between 60,000 and 100,000 Turkish nationals of Kurdish origin). In February 1990, more than 150 PKK militants clashed with police in front of the Grand Palais in Paris, where President Mitterrand was opening the "Suleiman the Magnificent" show together with Turgut Özal, his Turkish counterpart. Since then, PKK demonstrations have taken place almost every month in Paris. After their dissolution in late November 1993, the PKK's cover organizations, the Kurdistan Committee and Yek-Kom, regrouped under names such as the Kurdistan Information Center, the Cultural Association of Kurdish Workers in France, and the National Committee for Solidarity with the Kurdish People. Currently, there are said to be 1,000 PKK activists in France, and approximately 5,000 active sympathizers:

- In Sweden, there are approximately 10,000 Kurds⁸ and there are also sizable communities in the Netherlands (approximately 40,000), Belgium⁹ Denmark,

⁷ : *In Europe, the PKK hides behind a front called the "Kurdistan Committee," with offices in: Paris (shut down in November 1993); Brussels, Belgium; Basel, Switzerland; London, UK.; Cologne, Germany (shut down in November 1993); Vienna, Austria; Copenhagen, Denmark; Athens, Greece; The Hague, The Netherlands; Madrid, Spain; and Nicosia, Cyprus.*

⁸ : *However tolerant it may be of any Third World "Liberation Movement", since 1984, Sweden has nevertheless categorized the PKK as a "terrorist group," and banned Ocalan from visiting the country.*

⁹ : *In Belgium, the PKK has contacts with a small left wing extremist movement, the Belgian Labor Party [Parti du Travail de Belgique], which is active in the Kurdish mining*

Switzerland, and Great Britain. In the latter country, the PKK has 700 to 800 militants and active sympathizers in London. According to a confidential memorandum (dated February 1994) by the British National Criminal Intelligence Service [NCIS], racketeering among the Kurdish community in Great Britain brought in approximately FF20 million for the PKK in 1993;

- In Southern Europe, the PKK has a presence in Italy;

- Since hostility to Turkey is the rule there, the PKK is *persona grata* in Greece¹⁰ and in the Greek part of Cyprus.

Finally, it was in Western Europe that the PKK chose to establish, in early 1995, its itinerant "Parliament of Kurdistan in Exile." In late February, the "Preparatory Committee" for the first session of the "Parliament" met in Brussels, with deputies from the DEP [expansion unknown] in attendance. The first full-fledged session was held in The Hague in April 1995. In attendance were 65 "deputies," "elected by the Kurdish diaspora," according to the spokesman for the "Parliament," Yasar Kaya. Among the "deputies" were 12 members of the ERNK; the others were apparently nothing more than PKK stooges.

The PKK in Saudi Arabia

There are between 130,000 and 150,000 Kurdish guest workers from Turkey in Saudi Arabia (particularly in the construction industry), including approximately 30,000 "under the influence" of the PKK, which naturally levies a "revolutionary tax" on them, but also engages in narcotics trafficking in the Arabian Peninsula, according to local police sources. All told, trafficking and racketeering allegedly netted the PKK approximately FF20 million in 1993.

The PKK in the Former Eastern Bloc

Taking advantage of the "breaking down of barriers" under way in the East, the PKK is now actively establishing itself in Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine, all countries bordering the Black Sea, and therefore close to Turkey. In Bulgaria, PKK militants

communities in Limbourg, Verviers, and Liege, as well as in Brussels, one terminus of the Cologne-Brussels rail line, on which many Kurdish immigrants in Europe travel.

¹⁰ : In June 1990, in Athens, "Hamit," an ERNK leader attending the Conference of Socialist Parties of Europe and the Mediterranean, "thanked Greece for its support," and requested an extension of the annual \$10-million subsidy it had been granting the PKK. At the rostrum was Mikhailis Kharalambidis, from the Central Committee of PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement, the governing party in Greece].

threatened the Iraqi ambassador during the March-April 1995 Turkish offensive and branded Saddam Husayn as the "passive accomplice of the Ankara Army" in the affair.

Finally, in the former Soviet Union, home to approximately 155,000 Kurds in 1991, a "Confederation of Kurds of the CIS" was formed in November 1994. The group supports the "Kurdish national liberation struggle" and is close to the PKK. Its headquarters is in Moscow (where 10,000 Kurds live) and it now publishes a newsletter entitled Kurdish Report. Its Chairman, Yuriy Nabiyeu, preaches that it is the joint responsibility of the Russians and the Kurds to prevent Turkish expansion in Central Asia. "We do not consider the leaders and militants of the PKK to be terrorists," stated Nabiyeu (November 1994), and we will continue to maintain close ties with them" In February 1995, the PKK opened an office in Moscow, and immediately called on President Yeltsin to play the role of intermediary (?) between the Turks and the Kurds of Turkey.

The Kurds of the CIS are very close to the Armenians. As early as the Summer of 1992, Kurdish leaders of the former Soviet Union, and the German section of the PKK, established "Action Armenia" in Krasnodar. The purpose of the association was not only to help Armenia, but also, to facilitate the establishment of the PKK in Yerevan, thereby giving it a new base whence to attack eastern Turkey.

The PKK has also set up shop in Kazakstan, specifically in and around Almaty. As a result of deportations ordered under Stalin, between 150,000 and 200,000 Kurds live in the former Soviet Republic. PKK "missionaries" arrived in Kazakstan in late 1992 and recruited members from among the Turkish speaking Kurdish population. Since that time, the PKK has been distributing its literature in Almaty and racketeering among the city's Kurdish greengrocers. PKK teams have also taken over the local used car market, with the vehicles being "imported" from Europe or the Middle East and resold locally.

PKK Activities in the Caucasus

There have been Kurds in Transcaucasia since the late Eighteenth Century. Nomads at the time, they traveled over what would become Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, in search of grazing land for their flocks. The Christian communities (Armenians and Georgians) encouraged the settlement of Yazidi Kurds (whom the Muslims branded "devil worshippers"¹¹) on their lands, while the Azeris tended to take in Kurdish

¹¹ :The "Yazidis" are a little-known gnostic and dualist sect, all of whose adherents (between 100,000 and 300,000) are Kurds. Because the word "yazidi" is an insult among the Twelver Shiites (the Umayyad Caliph Yazid had Imam Husayn put to death at Karbala on October 10, 680), the Yazidis call themselves "Dawasin." They venerate

Muslims, either Sunni or Shiite. In July 1994, Armenia expelled groups of Kurdish Muslims, whom it considers a potential Azeri "fifth column."

The second venue for contacts between Armenians and Kurds is Lebanon. Dating back to the late 1970s (the alliance between the PKK and ASALA: see chronology, 1980), these contacts became official in 1984 at Barr Ilyas, when Ocalan met with the Lebanese Patriarch of the Armenian Gregorian (Orthodox) Church, whose Supreme Patriarchate is at Ejmiatsin, near Yerevan, in Armenia. A photograph of this little chat made the front pages in the Turkish dailies on May 24, 1994. The ties between the Gregorian Church and Dashnak¹² are very close in the Armenian diaspora. The meeting between the Patriarch and Ocalan therefore suggests an implicit Dashnak-PKK alliance.

A New "Lawless Area"

Against this backdrop, and the somewhat generalized indifference of Western Europe, a new scene, both criminal and terrorist, seems to have formed among the corrupt and activist elements of certain Armenian politico-military groups and the PKK. Meanwhile, this criminal and terrorist "underworld" is developing right at the outlet points of all the arms smuggling rings flourishing in the former Soviet Union as a result of the looting of former Soviet Army arsenals. They also receive support from certain elements, a very small, but unsavory, minority within the Armenian diaspora, one of the world's largest.

This scene has a territorial base: the "Kurdish Republic of Lajin," an enclave granted by the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh to their Kurdish allies, in the same place where the Kurds had an autonomous district during the 1920s, before Stalin and his "nationalities policy." This "Republic of Lajin" has a President, Mustafa Vekili, a military commander, Ihsan Aslan (an Armenian Kurd), and an avowed policy of support for the PKK.

the tomb of Shaykh Adi ibn Musafir (an Ismaili or Nestorian divine), located in northern Iraq, near Mosul. They worship and fear an evil angel in the form of a peacock, and abhor salad greens, perhaps because it brings back bad memories of the vegetarian Manicheans.

¹² :*The "Armenian Revolutionary Federation," (Dashnaktsutyun or Dashnak), an Armenian self-defense and pro-independence movement, was founded in 1890, when the situation had seriously deteriorated in the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian Archbishop at Ejmiatsin claimed to be the spiritual leaders of all Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as early as the Eighteenth Century.*

On December 28, 1994, in Armenia, President Levon Ter-Petrossian banned (for six months) Dashnak and all its satellite organizations, and had their offices occupied by the police and their property seized. The reason was that the

Dashnak Party includes a secret division known as "Dro," that has been operating in Armenia since 1992 and in the diaspora, and engaging in terrorism, arms and narcotics trafficking, racketeering, and spying on the Armenian Government. Some 50 agents strong, this "Dro" was unknown to most members of Dashnak and operated clandestinely out of Yerevan, Moscow, and Lebanon¹³. Its role was, in particular, to establish contacts with groups hostile to Turkey, such as the PKK. Finally, in May 1994, Armenian Government security forces arrested seven Kurds and three Armenians who were crossing the Armenian-Turkish border with a load of weapons and ammunition. The affair invoked the usual response from the PKK, i.e., a hunger strike among the Kurds of Yerevan. The investigation into this affair was still in progress as of Summer 1995.

The PKK and Drug Trafficking

The charges are serious. The PKK leaders themselves vehemently deny accusations of drug trafficking, and do not hesitate to use violent scare tactics (sit-ins, property damage, threats of bodily harm, etc.) to prevent the European media from broaching the subject. Let us therefore steer clear of unfounded, unsubstantiated, and uncorroborated statements, and proceed step by step. First, we will establish that there is indeed massive trafficking in narcotics from the "Golden Crescent" to Europe via Turkey, the Balkans, and the former Eastern Bloc. This trafficking involves numerous Turkish nationals, often natives of southeastern Anatolia, or "Turkish Kurdistan." Furthermore, impartial sources (INTERPOL, the British NCIS, and the police of the EU States) report that most of these traffickers operate for the benefit of Turkish-Kurdish revolutionaries or separatists, and most of these "dealers/militants" have ties to the PKK. Finally, we will demonstrate that while it is simplistic to say that "the PKK engages in drug trafficking," there is still a undeniable, enduring, and mutually profitable complicity between the Party of Abdallah Ocalan and the Kurdish crime clans, which may be likened to the "families" of the Sicilian Mafia. The biological, political, and criminal

¹³ :*The initial trial of 11 members of Dro, charged with "banditry, murder, premeditated murder, crime organized by more than one person (with aggravating circumstances), drug trafficking, illegal possession of weapons, and using false documents," was to be held in Yerevan during the Summer of 1995. See the reportage on the Dro case in Armenian Life Weekly, Los Angeles, March 10, 1995, in Gamk, a Paris-based daily, May-June 1995, and the address by Armenian President Ter-Petrossian to the Armenian Parliament on May 18, 1995.*

Country	No. of individuals	Amounts seized (*) involved
Austria	41	10 k
Bulgaria	8	44
France	45	32
Germany	473	982
Great Britain	18	178
Greece	8	23
Hungary	8	634
Italy	15	389
Netherlands	15	98
Spain	5	16
Total	636	2,406 k

ties between these clans and the PKK are so close that it is impossible to separate one from the other.

General Remarks, Methods, and Figures

According to INTERPOL, 42 tons and 442 kilos of heroin were seized during the decade from 1984 to 1993 in continental Europe (including Turkey, the Balkans, and the countries of the former Eastern Bloc, except the Soviet Union). Of this amount fourteen tons and 479 kilos were found on drug traffickers who were Turkish nationals, i.e., 34 percent of the total seized. The figures for 1994 are as follows:

(*) Rounded to the next highest kilo. Source: INTERPOL (1995).

One additional piece of information is that two-thirds of the heroin seized in the first half of 1994 by German police came from the Turkish Kurd connection.

According to the Turkish office of INTERPOL, which collects all data concerning Turkish nationals transmitted by the European offices of INTERPOL, during the decade between 1984 and 1993, 503 Turkish citizens, revolutionary militants and/or separatists, were initially implicated in drug trafficking. The details are as follows:

- The implication of 188 of these 503 individuals proved unfounded;
- Of the remaining 315, 166 were arrested in Germany, 82 in Turkey, 17 in the Netherlands, 12 in the Czech Republic, 9 each in France and Italy, 5 each in Belgium and Great Britain, 3 each in Spain and Switzerland, and 2 each in Denmark and Portugal;
- According to the reports of the various police forces involved, 298 of these individuals, i.e., 94.6 percent of the total, were either PKK militants or closely tied to that organization. The other 17 belonged to or had close ties with various other Turkish terrorist groups (TKP-ML [Turkiye Komunist Partisi - Marksist-Leninist - Turkish Marxist-Leninist Communist Party]: one; DEV SOL: two; THKP-C [Turkiye Halk Kurtulus ve Cephesi = Turkish People's Liberation Party or Front]: four; etc.);
- Of the 298 PKK members or sympathizers arrested, 154 of these arrests took place in Germany, 82 in Turkey, 17 in the Netherlands, 12 in the Czech Republic, 8 in France, 7

in Italy, 5 in Great Britain, 3 each in Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland, and 2 each in Denmark and Portugal.

For the sake of impartiality, let us put aside the 82 Turkish case files, and imagine that 20 percent of the individuals questioned in the rest of Europe were victims of gross judicial errors or anti-immigrant racism. That would still mean that nearly 55 percent of these drug trafficking cases followed by the police of 11 countries, including 10 EU, members involved individuals with close ties to the PKK.

This explains, at least in part, why the British NCIS estimates that in 1993, the annual budget of the PKK was approximately FF430 million, including approximately \$ 38 millions (44 percent of the total) from drug trafficking. The German police, for their part, have calculated that heroin trafficking brings in more than \$ 120 million a year for the Turkish Kurd crime families, politically minded and common criminals combined.

The PKK's drug trafficking exhibits the following features:

- It is based on contacts, again having both political and criminal dimensions, that the Kurdish separatists maintain among the Shiite clans of the Biqa Valley in Lebanon, or with insurgent tribes in Baluchistan (Iranian or Pakistani). PKK operatives in Iran play a key role in this process;
- Moving toward Syria and Lebanon, this trafficking takes on the form of a triangular barter arrangement, wherein luxury vehicles are stolen in Europe (especially Germany) and exchanged in the Middle East for heroin. The heroin, in turn, is exchanged for cash or weapons, according to needs. In July 1992, the German police took a confession from one Nurettin SE..., who described the inner workings of one such network, leading to further arrests in the Netherlands and Turkey. Similar trafficking implicating the PKK also takes place on the borderlands of Turkey, Naxçivan [Nakhichevan] (an Azerbaijani enclave), and Iran;
- In Turkey itself, as a precaution, no doubt, trafficking in drugs, the operation of laboratories to produce heroin, or the transporting of precursor chemicals such as acetic anhydride, more often involves the PKK's logistical networks (hide-outs, assisting the wounded, supply, collecting the "revolutionary tax," etc.) than guerrillas directly engaged in the armed struggle.

PKK: Drug Trafficking in Europe

In France: On March 17, 1994, the OCRTIS [Office central de repression du trafic illicite des stupefiants = Office for Halting Illegal Narcotics Trafficking] released a

document entitled "Judiciary Police Fourth Division Questioning of Three Turkish Nationals belonging to a Drug Trafficking Network: Seizure of Three Kilos of Heroin." The day before, at Saint-Ouen (93) and Paris, in the eleventh and eighteenth arrondissements, three individuals were stopped for questioning: Musa CA..., born in 1956 at Akcaday, Turkey, an unemployed political refugee; Mehmet SE..., born in 1963, in Bingol, Turkey, unemployed; and Orhan TA..., born 1963, another unemployed political refugee. The latter was carrying three one-kilo packets of heroin, delivered by the other two, who had recently arrived from Metz. "It should be noted," emphasizes the document, "that TA... is known by General Intelligence as a fundraiser for the PKK and that he is suspected of having engaged in drug trafficking to replenish the coffers of that movement." This is the proverbial "tip of the iceberg." Why not put together, and publish, a systematic listing of political refugees in France picked up for drug possession, say over the course of one year, that would include, where known, their party affiliation?

From 1990 to 1995, 82 Turkish nationals were questioned in France for possession of both firearms and significant amounts of heroin. In 21 of these cases, the amount involved was more than one kilo. In 35 cases, the heroin was from the Golden Crescent; in 8 cases, it was from Lebanon; and in the other 39 cases, the source was either someplace else (Golden Triangle, etc.), or unknown.

As early as 1985, Omer OZ... was held for questioning in Paris for "violating narcotics laws." In January 1990, the Versailles SRPJ arrested Gengiz KA... , Emirsak YI... , and Adem and Unal BA... for the same reason. In July 1990, Mehmet US... was arrested in Annemasse, Haute-Savoie Department, also for drug trafficking. All of these people were known PKK militants.

The Textbook Case of Hussein AY...-

In January 1991, the Criminal Investigation Department of the Nice Police Force picked up Turkish national Hussein AY... for questioning. AY... , born in January 1936, was carrying 2.5 kilos of heroin. His arrest led to that of Adnan IN... , a PKK fundraiser in Marseille, and Bahi CE... and Ercan CA... , the two of whom had already been arrested in August 1989 in Milan in possession of 10 kilos of heroin. As for Hussein AY... , he had long been in the employ of Turkish "Godfather" Behcet Canturk, and had already been held for questioning for drug trafficking in Germany (1970 and 1973), but had simply been sent back to Turkey. He then moved to Austria under a false identity, where he was sentenced to five years of prison for drug trafficking in 1977. Deported to Turkey in 1982, he was eventually sought for murder, which he viewed as a "political" act, and fled. In 1988, AY... moved to France under the false name of Yahya OB... That year, his son Timudin was threatened by drug traffickers tied to the "Gray Wolves" (Turkish nationalist extremists), whereupon the PKK, the group's sworn enemy, saved his son and heir's life. Hussein AY... then placed his talents at the disposal of the PKK. According to him, between 1989 and 1991, he brought approximately 300 kilos of heroin into Western Europe from Turkey, initially with his accomplice, Mustafa KA... , who was himself held for questioning in Brescia in 1990 carrying 10 kilos of heroin and sentenced to 15 years of prison.

Report by the Criminal Investigation Department of the Nice Police Force, June 10, 1994

Germany: Here, drug traffickers from Turkey take advantage of the particularly lenient juvenile crime laws and use children between the ages of 11 and 13 as "street dealers." These children, many of whom are from Bingol, sell five-gram packets of amply cut heroin for DM250, of which they keep DM50 for themselves. This enables them to send more than DM2,000 a month to their families back in Turkey. As early as 1988, Dr. Harald Korner, Frankfurt Public Prosecutor, stated: "we have noted that some

individuals who claim to be waging a war of liberation against Turkey have been involved in heroin trafficking, not for personal gain, but for the benefit of their cause." In November 1990, Cengiz B..., a known PKK militant, was arrested at the Dutch-German border (Arnhem) in possession of 48 kilos of heroin. In July 1991, Vahiddin KA... was arrested in Cologne carrying 2.5 kilos of heroin. This PKK guerrilla (since 1987) was known for having taken part, from May to September 1990, in "Turkish Kurdistan," in a whole series of bombing attacks and in the murder of two police officers at their station. In October 1993, in Recklinghausen, the police dismantled a drug trafficking network that was in possession of 1.6 kilos of heroin. Among its members were: Ibrahim CI... , a known PKK militant; Mehmet Cilik KI... , a PKK militant detained in December 1991, in Bingol, Turkey; Ismail HA... , wounded in May 1985 during an armed PKK attack not far from the city of Silopi. From October 25 to December 4, 1993, the Stuttgart Police conducted a major "anti-heroin dealing" operation, detaining 76 Turkish nationals, 13 of whom were known to the police for being active in the PKK right within Germany. Among them were Fevzi TU... and Cengiz SA... , who had participated in armed attacks in "Turkish Kurdistan," and Abdulhalik KA ... , Sedat KI..., Ekrem BE..., and Sami KA... also known PKK militants who belonged to the movement's logistical networks in Turkey. In May 1994, in Cologne, the police picked up approximately 20 Kurds, "members of a network of three families that covered all of Germany and handed over part of its take to the PKK." This network had sold 40 kilos of heroin since the summer of 1993.

Belgium and the Netherlands: In May 1988, in the Netherlands, Alil HA..., considered to be a PKK militant, was arrested while in possession of 72 kilos of heroin. In July 1989, Yilmaz S. and Ahmet Y., known PKK militants, were picked up in Belgium with 60 kilos of cocaine. In December 1991, Kemal and Cemal GU... were picked up in Arnhem and were in possession of 48 kilos of heroin. Cemal GU... was known as a PKK "military" cadre and wanted in Turkey for the murder of lieutenant and two gendarmes. In March 1993, Suleiman IY... was arrested in the Netherlands with two kilos of heroin. He admitted to the Dutch Police (who are not known for their fierceness) that he was a PKK militant. Osman AY..., from Icel, in Turkey, had sent him the drugs. Internal PKK documents and "revolutionary tax" receipts were found at his home. In December 1994, in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 180 police officers arrested Nejat KU and another 28 Kurds, all Turkish nationals. They were in possession of several handguns, two assault rifles, five grenades, and a sizable supply of propaganda material and internal PKK documents. They were subsequently charged with drug trafficking and kidnapping. The network extended to Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Turkey.

Spain: On November 25, 1989, on the 8:30 evening news of Spain's top TV channel, the newscaster quoted the police and the judges as saying: "Recently, Spain has experienced a major wave of drug trafficking by a "Kurdish network." All the members of this network, whose leaders were based in Istanbul, are Kurds and provide money and weapons to the illegal guerrilla movement fighting for an independent Kurdistan. In Spain, 50 members of this network have been arrested thus far. The organization operated in a highly professional manner. Heroin is moved in semitrailers from Istanbul to Madrid, via Ljubljana, Milan, and Amsterdam, cities in which the "Kurdish network" is also established. That network is said to have imported 300 kilos of heroin into France over the last six months. In January 1990, 12 PKK militants were taken into custody in Spain for having belonged to this "Kurdish network."

Italy: In May 1991, in Como, 23 kilos of heroin were discovered aboard a truck driven by Ali GU..., a member of the network of Naif AY..., closely tied to the PKK.

Yugoslavia: In March 1993, Suphi MU... and Metin BU... were arrested with four kilos of heroin. They confessed that PKK guerrillas in Turkey had threatened to kill them unless they agreed to take the drugs to other PKK militants in Cologne, Germany.

Kurdish Criminal Clans and the PKK

In the investigation that followed the September 1986 wave of attacks in Paris, the police uncovered a garbage can in the Forest of Fontainebleau containing both explosives and "brown sugar." The newspaper headlines claimed that "terrorists were financing themselves by selling drugs." This was not quite true. The reporters had forgotten that no act is really individual in a clan-based society, particularly not political militantism or religious activism. People do not join Hizballah or the PKK like they join the Rally for the Republic or the Socialist Party, by knocking at the door of the local headquarters on their own and filling out a membership form. Especially not in a rural or mountainous area. The collective group, the tribe or clan, is the one that allies itself with the entity that it hopes will ensure its salvation, either in this world or the next, and a symbiotic existence then develops. Thus, in the case of Hizballah, the clan's "ambassador" in Paris helps out his three oldest sons back in Jibshit, Hirmal, or Baalbak. So, Uncle Ali is a mechanic? They send him the car parts he needs. Cousin Imad is running a heroin lab? They store his powder, or sell it. Does Abu Husayn, of the local "Islamic Amal" militia, declare that a fatwah has ordered a strike against the French "little Satan"? They house his "pyrotechnical experts," and their bombs.

A similar symbiotic relationship links the PKK to the crime clans of southeastern Anatolia, who in turn resemble the Mafia "families" of Sicily: a tradition of rebellion

against the State, secrecy, and impermeability obtained by an intermingling of biological and criminal ties. There are about a dozen of these clans: the Aksoy, Aydinli, Baybasin, Canturk, Guven, Kitay, Kocakaya, Koylan, Ozdemir, Polat, Toprak, Ugur, and Yildirim, among others. In Europe, some of them sell, for approximately FF800,000 a kilo, wholesale, the heroin that they buy in the "Golden Crescent" for FF15,000 a kilo. Others control the entire process, from producing the powder from Asian morphine base all way to running the "street dealing" in Western Europe, always in sizable quantities. Several of these clans, with various ranges of activities, are portrayed below, with a description of their trafficking and their known ties to the PKK.

The Baybasin Clan: An alert from INTERPOL-Germany (October 26, 1993) indicated that the Baybasin family was conducting an extensive heroin trafficking operation between Turkey, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain, and "laundering" sizable sums of money in Europe. The head of the clan is Hussein Baybasin, born in Lice in 1956, picked up in Istanbul in 1976 while in possession of 11 kilos of heroin, then in Great Britain in 1984 with 6 kilos of the same drug, for which he was sentenced to 12 years in prison. The clan also includes Mehmet Emin Baybasin, born in Lice in 1942, Hussein's uncle, who, in February 1994, was sought in Turkey in connection with a "laboratory" in the village of Yagmurlu, not far from Lice, where the police found 67 kilos of heroin. Nedim Baybasin, born in Lice in 1965, Hussein's cousin and Mehmet Emin's son, was at the scene. Nedim was arrested in Germany on June 13, 1984, (along with Mehmet Serif Baybasin, born in Lice in 1944) with 32 kilos of heroin and subsequently sentenced to 13 years in prison. Mehmet Emin and Mehmet Serif have close ties with Kurdish separatists, and the latter is known to German police as a PKK arms trafficker. All told, there are a dozen or so Baybasin brothers, cousins, uncles, etc., with records in several European countries, and whose similar exploits could fill a book.

The Kitay Clan: Hakki Kitay was arrested on September 1, 1993, at a Turkish border checkpoint in Kapikule, en route from Bulgaria, based on a tip from the Dutch, German, and British Police, following the seizure of 14.8 kilos of heroin in the Turkish city of Icel on October 29, 1992. Sentenced in Turkey on October 19, 1993, to 10 years in prison for drug trafficking, Hakki and his clan are tied to 22 cases involving the importation of a total of 1.2 tons of heroin into Germany between 1990 and 1993. While under surveillance during a "business trip" to Germany, on October 23, 1992, Hakki contacted Emin Uysal and Selim Curukkaya, aka "Tilki Selim" (Selim the fox), top managers of the PKK's financial operations in Germany. Hakki is the brother of Vahdettin Kitay, aka "Veli", head of a regional PKK guerrilla operation, who was killed in October 1989, in a clash with the Turkish Police in which one police officer was killed. Hakki is the father of Nizamettin Kitay, aka "Vedat," who trained at the PKK's

"military academy" in Lebanon, and is a cadre in the PKK's guerrilla unit in Bingol Province, led by Mahmut Curukkaya, aka "Doctor Suleiman," who is the brother of the above-mentioned "Tilki Selim." Between May and November 1993, German police dismantled a network, between Hamburg and Bremen, of 22 "political refugees" or "asylum seekers" in possession of 16 kilos of heroin. Among them were Ihsan and Senol Kitay. The latter, Hakki's son, was murdered in Germany shortly thereafter. Also arrested in the case were Sehabettin AT former head of the PKK for the city of Elazig, and two other known Party militants. In this instance too, other Kitay had drug trafficking records in several European countries.

The Sakik Clan: On June 16, 1994, "Servet Ipek," born in 1964, was arrested for murder in Germany. The investigation showed that "Ipek's" real name was Seyyar Sakik, born in Mush, in 1962, wanted in Turkey, and on the lam in Germany. It also uncovered that the murder was the end result of the trafficking of 190 kilos of heroin between Turkey and Germany. Seyyar Sakik's brothers are Sirri Sakik, a DEP deputy, and Semdin Sakik, until recently head of PKK guerrilla operations in Tunceli Province, and now regarded as the PKK's number two "political" leader. In Germany, Idriss Sakik, a cousin of the first two, is in charge of wholesale heroin sales. In Turkey, the Sakik Clan is known for its pro-PKK militancy.

The Konuklu-Ay Clan: On March 8, 1995, following several months of surveillance, the Police uncovered two heroin refining labs near the village of Saray, in the Turkish Province of Tekirdag, and arrested 14 members, or allies, of the Konuklu and Ay clans. The labs were found to contain 92 kilos of heroin, 336 kilos of Afghan morphine base, and 32 kilos of acetic anhydride, in addition to two Kalashnikovs, various handguns, and internal PKK documents. One of the farms belonged to the Konuklu, specifically Mrs. Gulistan Konuklu, herself a daughter of Nasrullah Ay, a PKK cadre. In the Konuklu clan, headed by Mehmet Ali Konuklu, Nihat, Ramazan, and Sahin Konuklu manage the heroin production operations, and Yusuf Konuklu handles overseas sales and marketing. The second lab was owned by Nusrettin Ay. His sons, Hikmet and Kurbettin, produce the drug, while two other sons, Heybet and Ali, sell it overseas. Documents found on the scene showed that part of the profits go to the PKK. Some members of these clans are also active in the PKK logistical unit: care for the wounded, supplying radios, runners, propaganda distribution, etc.

The Senar Clan: In December 1986, Turgut Senar, who ran a film production company in Istanbul, was arrested with 1.6 kilos of heroin in Van Province and indicted. In September 1989, Istanbul Police found nearly 40 kilos of heroin in a car that belonged to him. He was arrested in September 1991, in Van, for participation in PKK armed

operations. PKK "revolutionary tax" receipts totaling 30 million Turkish lira were found on him. Fahit Senar, Turgut's brother, was arrested on October 1992, in Izmir, while hiding 81 kilos of heroin aboard the cargo ship Florida, bound for Italy. He is still in custody.

The Kaya Clan: In September 1992, in Duisburg, Germany, 20.3 kilos of heroin were discovered aboard a TIR semitrailer. The two drivers were Nezir Kaya, born in 1966, in Nusaybin, Turkey, and Hasib Kaya, born in 1969, in the same town. The vehicle belonged to the trucking company of Osman Kaya, Nezir's brother and Hasib's cousin, which was located in Icel. Tipped off by their German colleagues, the Turkish Police raided the company's premises in May 1993. They found 18 Kalashnikovs and 4,000 cartridges in a secret compartment in a tanker truck, bound for a PKK guerrilla unit.

The Demir Clan: In January 1993, police in Offenbach, Germany, dismantled a network headed by Abdulkudusi Demir. He confessed to having paid DM250,000 a year (approximately FF800,000) to a PKK fundraiser, in order to be able to sell drugs. In October 1994, the German weekly Focus exposed the Demir clan as one of the major heroin traffickers in Germany. According to that publication, the Demirs controlled a hotel chain in Istanbul, as well as garages and electronic appliance stores.

The European friends of the PKK

Such a series of disquieting incidents, far from secret, should suggest that European political parties or newspapers approached by the PKK or its satellite organizations would do well to observe a modicum of caution. Particularly since the judges of Europe, however well-disposed they may be toward the Kurds, have confirmed how dangerous Ocalan's Party is. In April 1995, several PKK militants were brought before the Paris Correctional Court on extortion charges. For the judges, the PKK is a "perfectly structured organization," a clandestine one, whose main activity, that of armed struggle in Turkey, is accompanied by acts of violence against people and property, particularly in France, such as the murder of renegades or the occupation and destruction of Turkish diplomatic missions or businesses." As early as November 1993, the decision that ordered the dissolution of Yek-Kom and the Kurdistan Committee stipulated that: [these two entities] "give the appearance of combat units or private militias, due to the paramilitary training in training camps, obedience, and discipline to which their members are subjected, and the insurrectionist motives that characterize them, and that make them suitable for commando actions...in France, or from French territory, they engage in schemes designed to provoke acts of terrorism in France or abroad."

And that's not all. On November 12, 1992, the Tehran Islamic fundamentalist daily Kayhan reported that after fights, the PKK guerrillas are finishing off their own wounded. According to an account by Hosni, a 19-year-old Syrian Kurd, found dying by Peshmergas in Iraq: "There were 18 of us wounded, and we couldn't walk anymore. Each of us received a bullet in the head. I was the only one who survived." Apo's party employs these practices in Europe too. In March 1994, in Dusseldorf, Germany, Ali A., age 32, and Hassan H.G., age 40, PKK cadres, were sentenced to life in prison for having strangled a "traitor" to the PKK with a rope and having shot two others to death.

Finally, the PKK openly wages indiscriminate terrorist campaigns in Turkey, planting bombs on the streets of cities or resort towns. One such attack was in February 1994. The unit in charge of these attacks is named "ARGK Metropolitan Vengeance Groups."

Despite this, the PKK still has friends in Europe. In March 1992, some Greek Socialist deputies held a press conference with the PKK in the Biqa Valley. In April 1994, ERNK opened its "Greece and Balkans Office" in Athens. During the opening ceremony, a Deputy Chairman (PASOK) of the Greek Parliament and four Socialist deputies heard Ali Sapan, widely known as the head of the PKK in Europe, read a message from Ocalan. In March 1995, a Socialist International (SI) commission on "on the Kurdish question in Turkey and Iraq" met in Vienna. Seated around the table were representatives of the Socialist Parties of Germany, Denmark, France (Alain Chenal), Sweden, and Switzerland. On the Kurdish side, according to an SI communiqué, were leaders of the DEP and the ERNK (PKK fronts) and the PUK (Iraq, headed by Jalal Talabani, now financed and armed by the Islamic Republic of Iran¹⁴), without any other Turkish or Kurdish representative. In June 1995, four Greek deputies from PASOK held a "political" meeting with Ocalan, then shook his hand for the cameras. ■

¹⁴ :See, in particular, the news item of July 15, 1995, from the Egyptian press agency MENA [Middle East News Agency], an impartial source on this matter. It reveals that Islamic Iran is supplying Talabani with sizable quantities of heavy weaponry to help him gain mastery over the lawless area of northern Iraq.